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THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS IN
FURTHERING NATIONAL
ECONOMIC AND
SOCIOECONOMIC
POLICIES
THoMAs W. REILLY*
INTRODUCTION
In 1940 the Supreme Court in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.' stated that
[1]ike private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the unre-
stricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it
will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed
purchases.'
Most of us generally are aware of the various means the federal govern-
ment uses to artificially manipulate or stimulate the private sector of the
national economy. Among the more publicized interventions in the private
sector have been programs established to stem buying or buying power
during periods of inflation, projects designed to offset serious localized or
nationwide unemployment, and policies adopted to discourage discrimina-
tion in employment adversely affecting minority groups. We are generally
familiar with the way the federal government fluctuates interest rates and
reserve requirements, prescribes minimum wages and import tariff rates,
and influences farm production by price supports and subsidies for plant-
ing certain crops and not planting others. We are also cognizant of the
*Chairman of Atomic Safety & Licensing Board, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; B.A.,
1954, LL.B., 1956, St. John's University; LL.M., 1969, George Washington University Gradu-
ate School of Public Law. Member of the New York and Federal Bar, admitted to practice
before the U.S. Court of Claims, U.S. Court of Military Appeals, and the Supreme Court of
the United States.
310 U.S. 113 (1940).
Id. at 127 (footnote omitted).
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Government's insistence on nondiscrimination in defense industries and
Government employment, and its encouragement of small business by its
loan program, in order to further certain well-defined economic and socioe-
conomic objectives. Not so familiar to the average American is the extent
of the role played by the Government's procurement program in furthering
these policies. One would naturally expect that when the Government
contracts for necessary goods and services, it would not do so in such a way
as to vitiate the nation's overall social and economic goals. But the deliber-
ate specificity with which the Government includes these objectives as
requirements in its procurement contracts (as well as in subcontracts made
by its prime contractors) may not be so generally understood. At the same
time, the tremendous volume of Government contracting and subcontract-
ing and, consequently, its substantial impact on the economy in furthering
those particular objectives may not be generally perceived.
For some appreciation of the impact this one force-Government pro-
curement-has on the national economy, one need only look briefly at
statistics.3 Total Gross National Product (GNP) in calendar year 1960 was
$504 billion; total federal government purchases of goods and services
amounted to $53 billion. In 1965, the GNP was $685 billion with Govern-
ment purchases at $67 billion. In 1967, the GNP grew to $789 billion while
total Government purchases rose to $91 billion, almost one-eighth of the
total GNP. Needless to say, after 1963, with the tremendous expansion of
the effort in Vietnam, the volume of Government procurement increased
considerably. Defense spending in 1967 was half again as large as that in
1963.' Conversely, after Vietnam the volume decreased somewhat, but it
still accounted for large-scale procurement activity and represented the
lion's share of the federal dollar. Total GNP in 1973 was $1295 billion, with
Government purchases at $107 billion. While post-Vietnam figures indi-
cate a decline in Government purchases as a percentage of GNP, Govern-
ment defense spending still accounts for over eight percent of the GNP and
thus continues to have a substantial impact on the national economy.5
In addition to the aforementioned expenditures of the Defense Depart-
ment, five other federal agencies each procure more than $1 billion of goods
and services annually.' Nevertheless, since the beginning of World War II,
defense procurement has represented an overwhelming proportion of total
federal .government procurement-21.5 billion out of 25 billion procure-
ment dollars spent in fiscal year 1957, $44.6 billion out of $54.3 billion
See ECON. INDICATORS, Oct. 1974, at 2; id., Sept. 1968, at 2. See also Miller & Pierson,
Observations on the Consistency of Federal Procurement Policies with Other Governmental
Policies, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 277, .277-78 (1964).
1 ECON. INDICATORS, Sept. 1968, at 2.
Id., Oct. 1974, at 2.
1 AEC-$3.4 billion; NASA-$2.4 billion; GSA-$1.6 billion; HEW-$1.2 billion; TVA-$1.0
billion. GSA, PROCUREMENT BY CIVILIAN EXECUTrVE AGENCIES, REP. No. 2773 (for fiscal year
1974).
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spent in fiscal year 1967, and $40 billion out of $54 billion in fiscal year
1974.1 As these figures indicate, military procurement expenditures repre-
sent a greater economic force than any other single procurement activity.
In terms of impact on employment, aside from the fact that the Defense
Department has over a million civilian employees of an entire federal
civilian employment of approximately three million,' the number of non-
government employees working in defense and defense-related industries
was over 3.2 million during the Vietnam War year of 1968,1 and during the
immediate post-Vietnam period remained at over two million.'0 If the
foregoing figures fail to impress upon us the widespread impact which
could be realized through inclusion of social and economic policy provi-
sions in Government contracts, consider the fact that in fiscal year 1974
alone over 10,338,000 separate procurement actions were effected by the
Defense Department."
There are many ways within the contracting scheme by which the
Government affirmatively furthers its national economic and socioeco-
nomic policies. Some of these procurement devices are:
(1) antidiscrimination and equal opportunity clauses in all
Government contracts and in subcontracts made by Govern-
ment prime contractors, pursuant to Executive Order 11,246;2
(2) forty-hour week and time-and-a-half for overtime clauses
pursuant to the Contract Work Hours & Safety Standards Act 3
(construction contracts) and the Walsh-Healy Act 4 (manufac-
turing contracts);
(3) a clause prohibiting the use of convict labor pursuant to
the Convict Labor Law," Executive Order 325-A'6 and the
GSA, PROCUREMENT BY CIVILIAN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, REP. No. 2773 (for fiscal years 1957,
1967, & 1974); DOD, MILITARY PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS (annual reports for fiscal years 1957,
1967, & 1974).
' U.S. CIVIL SERV. COMM'N, REPORT ON FED. CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT (for month ending Sept.
30, 1974).
1 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT ATTRIBUTABLE TO DOD MILITARY EXPENDITURES BY INDUS.
SECTOR; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 263, table 417
(1973) (for year ending June 30, 1968).
IS U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (for year ending June
30, 1973).
11 DOD, MILITARY PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS (annual report for fiscal year 1974).
12 3 C.F.R. 418 (1972). See 32 id. §§ 7.103-18, 12.800 et seq. (1974).
13 40 U.S.C. § 328 (1970). See 32 C.F.R. §§ 7.103-16(a), 7.602-23(a)(2), 7.607-11, 12.301 (1974).
" 41 U.S.C. § 35(c) (1970). See 32 C.F.R. §§ 7.103-17, 12.601 (1974).
15 18 U.S.C. § 436 (1970). Exec. Order No. 325-A (May 18, 1905) implemented and extended
the policy set forth in the Convict Labor Law by requiring that a contract article reflecting
the law's purpose be included in all Government contracts involving the use of labor. See also
Exec. Order No. 11,755, 39 Fed. Reg. 779 (1973); 32 C.F.R. §§ 7.104-17, 7.607-12, 12.202
(1974).
11 Exec. Order No. 325-A (May 18, 1905).
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Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act;"
(4) a clause prohibiting child labor pursuant to the Walsh-
Healey Act'8 and the Fair Labor Standards Act;'"
(5) a clause requiring that construction workers be paid no
less than the prevailing wage in a given locality, pursuant to the
Davis-Bacon Act,"0 and without any unauthorized deductions,
pursuant to both the Copeland "Anti-Kickback" Act" and the
Davis-Bacon Act," with similar minimum wage requirements
for manufacturing and supply contracts by virtue of the Walsh-
Healy Act, 3 and for service contracts by virtue of the Service
Contract Act;2 1
(6) partial and total set-asides of contracts for the benefit of
small businesses25 and "labor surplus areas" (better known as
"depressed areas" or high unemployment areas), 6 and a con-
tract clause in large procurements requiring the prime contrac-
tor to subcontract a certain amount or proportion of the total
contract amount to a specified number of small suppliers or
component manufacturers (popular in "weapons system" pro-
curements); 2
(7) provisions for loans, tax assistance, and working capital
financing for small businesses and companies in "labor surplus
areas,"28 provisions for the use of Government-owned or leased
buildings and equipment by private contractors and subcon-
tractors not having their own means of producing what the Gov-
ernment wants to buy,2 provisions for "know-how" or
knowledge-sharing by the Government with the contractor and
subcontractors or between the prime contractor and other prime
contractors already producing for the Government under a sepa-
rate contract, 30 and "pooling arrangements" between several
" 41 U.S.C. § 35(d) (1970). See 32 C.F.R. § 12.601 (1974).
11 41 U.S.C. § 35(d) (1970). See 32 C.F.R. § 12.601 (1974).
1 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1970). See 32 C.F.R. § 12.701 (1974).
,* 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1970). See 32 C.F.R. § 7.602-23(a)(1) (1974).
21 18 U.S.C. § 874 (1970). See 32 C.F.R. § 7.602-23(a)(1)(a) (1974). See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 3.1,
3.9 (1974).
2 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1970).
23 41 id. § 35(b). See 32 C.F.R. § 12.601 (1974).
" 41 U.S.C. § 351(a) (1970). See 32 C.F.R. § 12.1001 (1974). See also 29 C.F.R. § 4.168 (1974).
' See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1.706-5, -6 (1974). See also 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1970).
" 32 C.F.R. §§ 1.706-7, 1.804, 7.2003-5 (1974). See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1.706-1(a), 2.407-6(a)(2)
(1974) and 29 id. § 8.8 for the order of preference.
" See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1.707, 7.104-14, 7.602-26 (1974).
, See Defense Contract Financing Regs., id. pt. 163.
" See id. §§ 7.706-4, 13.000 et seq.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 637(b)(1)(A), 638(b)(2)-(3), (d) (1970); 32 C.F.R. §§ 1.304-2(b)(3), 1.705-
5(b)(3), 4.117, 4.701, 13.401 (1974).
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small firms organized by the Government into a "small business
production pool;"'"
(8) "Buy American" clauses" which follow the Government's
economic and political policies favoring American businesses
over foreign manufacturers and the nation's balance of pay-
ments position; 3 and
(9) the deliberate awarding of large military prime contracts
to selected localities according to both the national interest and
the urgent economic needs of the areas receiving the awards.
34
A few of these devices are patently self-explanatory, but a general
background discussion of the origin and mechanics of some of them might
prove helpful and, hopefully, somewhat interesting. The following discus-
sion utilizes the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR)35 as the
main regulatory source for the above-mentioned contract clauses due to
the dominant economic influence of the Defense Department. ASPR
governs all the contracting and procurement activities of the military
services. The Federal Procurement Regulations 3 govern the contracting
and procurement activities of many of the Government's civilian agencies,
although some follow their own internal regulations. Aside from the domi-
nance of military procurement in the federal government, however, the
social and economic policy considerations specifically reflected in ASPR
clauses are also set forth in similar sections of the procurement regulations
governing the other Government agencies.
FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICEs REQUIRED BY GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
During World War II the problem of a short labor supply became
3, See 32 C.F.R. § 1.302-3 (1974).
32 See id. §§ 6.120-1 (supply and service contracts), 18.507 (construction contracts). See also
Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § 10a (1970).
3 See 32 C.F.R. §§ 6.100, 6.102-2, 6.800 (1974).
The 1968 congressional dispute over the awarding of the TFX F-111 fighter plane contract
to General Dynamics in Ft. Worth, Texas is illustrative of the important role which locality
needs assume in the making of such awards. Senator Jackson of Washington was fighting hard
for Boeing of Seattle to get the disputed contract. At the time, Boeing and the entire Seattle
area were suffering from severe unemployment, partially the result of losing an anticipated
Government contract to build an SST (supersonic transport). But the Ft. Worth area had
similar unemployment problems. Both Admiral Anderson and Senator McClellan, who op-
posed the award to the Ft. Worth firm, agreed that if the Defense Department's announced
purpose was to keep solvent a defense plant like General Dynamics, opposition would proba-
bly cease. See U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 2, 1968, at 49-50; Washington Daily News,
Nov. 19, 1968, at 7.
The legislative source for the Armed Services Procurement Regulations is the Armed Serv-
ices Procurement Act of 1947, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2314 (1970). The regulations are issued by
direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installation & Logistics) pursuant to author-
ity in DOD Directive No. 4105.30 (Mar. 11, 1959) and 10 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970). See also 32
C.F.R. pts. 1-30 (1974).
U 41 C.F.R. pt. 1 (1974) (issued pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 486(c) (1970)).
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acute. One industry after another requested that men on active military
duty be released to perform civilian services otherwise unavailable. Men
were released to work in mines, in the aircraft industry, in the tire industry,
in the forge and foundry industry, and in farm equipment repair. Tempo-
rary releases from active duty were granted to workers in the food canning
industry and agriculture. Boys age thirteen and over were recruited to work
summers on farms as part of a "Victory Farmers" program. Former mer-
chant seamen in the military were allowed discharges to return to work in
the merchant marine. Ninety-day furloughs were granted for military per-
sonnel to work in cotton duck plants and heavy ammunition factories.
Both outright release and furloughs were used to supply military personnel
for railroad work. Discrimination against Blacks aggravated the labor sup-
ply problem, thus quite apart from the moral considerations, discrimina-
tion was a senseless waste of vital manpower resources.37
In June 1941, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 88020 re-
quiring all procurement contracts of the federal government to contain a
provision committing the contractor not to discriminate against any em-
ployee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or na-
tional origin. Bolstered by this executive order, Black employment in war
industries more than doubled between 1942 and 1945.11 Executive Order
8802 applied only to defense industries but the policy was extended to all
Government contracting agencies by Executive Orders 9001 and 9346.10
Subsequent executive orders issued by Presidents Truman,4 Eisenhower,42
Kennedy,43 Johnson," and Nixon'5 have kept the policy in continuous ef-
fect. By Executive Order 11,375, President Johnson further extended the
policy to prohibit discrimination based on sex.41
President Roosevelt, in order to ensure compliance with the nondiscri-
mination requirement, established the Fair Employment Practice Com-
mittee (FEPC)47 which functioned during World War II. For a seven-year
period after the war the policy of requiring nondiscrimination provisions
in federal contracts remained in effect, but the executive order continuing
it did not provide for an agency with overall responsibility for compliance.
11 Shulman, Labor Policy and Defense Contracts: A Matter of Mission, 29 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRon. 238, 260-61 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Shulman].
11 6 Fed. Reg. 3201 (1941).
Shulman, supra note 37, at 261.
,0 Exec. Order No. 9001, 6 Fed. Reg. 6787 (1941); Exec. Order No. 9346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183
(1943).
" Exec. Order No. 10,308, 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1951).
, Exec. Order No. 10,479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953).
" Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961); Exec. Order No. 11,114, 28 Fed. Reg.
6485 (1963).
, Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
, Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1969).
32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967).
,7 Exec. Order No. 8802, § 3, 6 Fed. Reg. 3201 (1941).
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In 1951, however, President Truman created the President's Committee on
Government Contract Compliance (CGCC) which operated to the end of
Truman's term.' In 1953, President Eisenhower signed Executive Order
10,479 creating the President's Committee on Government Contracts
(CGC) 9 as the successor to Truman's CGCC. Eisenhower's CGC operated
throughout his term of office, to the end of 1960. In 1961, President Ken-
nedy, under a new and much broader executive order created the Presi-
dent's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (CEEO)5 0 The
order stated that discrimination is contrary to both constitutional princi-
ples and the policy of the United States to utilize all available manpower
efficiently and effectively. The order provided substantial enforcement
powers, including the termination of existing contracts, debarment from
future Government contract awards, judicial injunctions, and criminal
proceedings where proper. The order required government contractors and
subcontractors to not discriminate in advertisements for prospective em-
ployees; to advise labor unions, the employees themselves and applicants
of this policy; and to agree to abide by all the rules and regulations, includ-
ing compliance reporting, established by the Committee on Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity. 5' The same order also directed federal agencies to pro-
vide equal employment opportunities in their own hiring practices. This
policy applied to contractors doing business directly with the federal gov-
ernment. Two years later, President Kennedy issued Executive Order
11,114, extending the requirements to all firms which contract for con-
struction that is federally assisted by means of grant, loan, or insurance,5"
thus encompassing even those contractors dealing with state or local gov-
ernments on construction projects totally or partially funded through fed-
eral assistance. It was estimated in 1964 that some 38,000 contractors were
covered by the original Kennedy Order.5" That figure did not encompass
contractors later covered by the more expansive Executive Order 11,114.11
President Johnson extended and amplified the policy by virtue of
," Exec. Order No. 10,308, § 2, 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1951).
," Exec. Order No. 10,479, § 3, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953).
o Exec. Order No. 10,925, § 101, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
51 Id.
52 Exec. Order No. 11,114, § 101, 28 Fed. Reg. 6485 (1963).
Powers, Federal Procurement and Equal Employment Opportunity, 29 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 468, 473 (1964).
-" For some appreciation of the broadening effect of Exec. Order No. 11,114, consider the fact
that federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments totalled $36 billion for fiscal year
1972 and over $45 billion for fiscal year 1973. Most of these funds were for construction of
one sort or another, such as National Guard facilities, agricultural and rural development,
protection of natural resources and the environment, aid to airports, highway construction,
and community development and housing. Taking highway construction alone, the total
value of federally aided highway projects, from 1963 through fiscal year 1974, was over $46.5
billion. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BuDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AID TO STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1973). See also U.S. BUREAU OF COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT AND Do-
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Executive Order 11,246,.5 which also transferred to the Secretary of Labor
the compliance duties, responsibilities, and authority formerly exercised
by the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity
(CEEO).5 This order also delegated to the Civil Service Commission the
responsibility for ensuring equal employment and promotional opportuni-
ties in Government employment. 7 The CEEO has, in practical working
effect, been replaced by the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance (OFCC), insofar as enforcement of equal employment in
Government contracting is concerned. The Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Commission (EEOC), however, does have certain overlapping investi-
gative and reporting duties pursuant to its administration of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 For example, a report to the EEOC on total
employment and ethnic breakdown is required of all holders of federal
contracts of $50,000 or more if the firm has at least 50 employees. 5 In 1967,
Executive Order 11,246 was amended by Executive Order 11,375 to ex-
pressly embrace discrimination based on sex."
The equal opportunity policy enunciated by these executive orders is
set forth in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) section
XII, part 81 which also states that each contracting agency has the respon-
sibility for insuring compliance.62 ASPR sections 7.103-18 and 12.8043 set
forth the required equal opportunity clause (a long series of paragraphs
that must be included verbatim in all nonexempt prime contracts and
subcontracts). ASPR section 12.805 states the exemptions: transactions of
MESTIC POLICY, CONSTRUCTION REVIEW (1974); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES at 417, table 666, at 539, table 888 (1973).
' 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965). For a case which challenged the Government's right to require
nondiscrimination clauses in all Government contracts pursuant to Executive Order 11,246
see Printing Local 604 v. Union Camp Corp., 350 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ga. 1972). It was held
that such right is based on the inherent or implied power of the executive branch to determine
the terms and conditions under which the United States will contract and that it is a valid
exercise of presidential authority, possessing the same force and effect as statutory law. Id.
at 635.
56 Exec. Order No. 11,246, §§ 201, 403, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
5 Id. §§ 103-05.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970).
41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(a) (1974).
32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967). Executive Order 11,246 was further amended in 1969 by Execu-
tive Order 11,478, which expressly ordered the head of each executive department and agency
to establish "an affirmative program of equal employment." Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed.
Reg. 12,985 (1969).
1, 32 C.F.R. § 12.800 et seq. (1974). There is a similar section in the Federal Procurement
Regulations, 41 id. § 1-12.801.
62 An interesting collateral question of whether an employer can plead that collective bargain-
ing agreements with labor unions prevent him from complying with the Government's equal
opportunity program requirements was answered in the negative in Southern Ill. Builders
Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972).
63 There is a similar section in the Federal Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 1-12.803-2
(1974).
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$10,000 or under, work outside the United States, and contracts with state
or local governments not participating in work on or under the contract or
subcontract. ASPR section 12.805 further provides for contracts to be ex-
empted by the Secretary of Defense in the interest of national security, and
for specific exemptions by the Director of the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance.
ASPR section 12.804(c) provides that whether or not it is actually
included the required equal opportunity clause shall be considered a part
of every nonexempt contract and subcontract. ASPR section 12.813 de-
scribes the sanctions as including partial or total termination of the con-
tract or subcontract, debarment or suspension from receiving future Gov-
ernment contracts, and referral to the Department of Justice or the EEOC
for institution of appropriate civil or criminal proceedings. The latter de-
vice is utilized to enjoin whoever is responsible for preventing compliance
or to prosecute persons responsible for reporting false information.
By the terms of the required equal opportunity clause, the contractor
agrees not only to not discriminate against any employee or applicant for
employment, but also to take affirmative action to ensure that applicants
are employed and that during employment, employees are treated without
regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The clause encompas-
ses recruitment, selection for training, apprenticeship, promotion, demo-
tion, rates of compensation and layoffs. By the terms of ASPR section
12.806(a), and pursuant to the regulations of the OFCC,11 all contractors
in nonexempt contracts estimated to be for $1 million or more, as well as
first tier subcontractors with proposed subcontractors of $1 million or
more, are subject to preaward compliance review to assure that they are
able to comply with the terms of the required equal opportunity clause.
ASPR section 12.807-1 provides that with regard to all nonexempt
contracts, each prime contractor and each subcontractor with 50 or more
employees and a contract or subcontract of $50,000 or more is required to
develop a written affirmative action compliance program 5 within 120 days
of the start of his first Government contract. ASPR section 12.807-2 sets
forth factors and ingredients to be included in an acceptable program for
contracts other than construction contracts. ASPR section 12.807-3 pre-
scribes that an acceptable affirmative action program for construction
contracts meet the requirements of the Secretary of Labor," including the
requirement for approved local plans. Such local plans may require that
- Id. § 60.1.
61 See 32 id. § 1.332-1, which states "that the national interest requires increased involvement
of minority business enterprises in Federal procurement programs," pursuant to the policy
set forth in Executive Order 11,458, 34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (1969) and amplified by Executive
Order 11,625, 36 Fed. Reg. 19967 (1971). See also 32 C.F.R. §§ 1.332-2, 7.104-36 (1974), which
require government contractors to assume affirmative obligations in regard to subcontracting
with minority business enterprises.
" These requirements are set forth in 41 C.F.R. § 60-1-.40 (1974).
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prospective contractors include percentage goals for minority employment
in their bids or proposals."
Provisions for contracting officer clearance, the filing and processing
of complaints, the filing of required contractor reports,' and enforcement
procedures are set forth in ASPR sections 12.808-2, 12.809, 12.810, 12.812,
and 12.813, respectively. Sanctions and penalties for violation of the EEOC
executive order, regulations of the Secretary of Labor or the required
EEOC contract clauses are set forth in ASPR section 12.814.
Following the lead of the federal government, many major American
industries such as the automotive industry, have adopted private equal
opportunity standards of their own.68
LABOR STANDARDS REQUIRED IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
During the 1930's this country was in dire economic straits, caught in
the grip of a seemingly bottomless depression. Widespread unemployment
had a vicious downward-spiralling effect on wages. As competition for
limited markets grew more intense while unemployment and available
labor supply increased, cost-cutting employers steadily reduced wages to
meet the competition of falling prices and falling demand.
One attempt to stop this trend in the economy was the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,11 which provided codes of fair competition
in wages and prices. To add further impetus to these codes through utiliza-
tion of its extensive purchasing machinery, Congress worked to require
certain "fair labor standards" and practices of government contractors.
The Davis-Bacon Act70 requires federal contractors to pay locally prevail-
ing wages to laborers and mechanics performing contracts for construction,
repair, and alteration of federal government public buildings and works.7"
Another device, the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act of 1936,72 was
11 See Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
854 (1971), wherein an attack on the much publicized "Philadelphia Plan" was rejected by
the Third Circuit. This plan required a contractor to establish goals for utilization of minority
manpower in six trades for a five-county area. Plaintiffs complained that the plan violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which expressly disavowed requiring that employers
of a given area give preferential treatment to a particular race because of an existing imbal-
ance between the percentage of employed persons of that race and the number available for
the work force. 442 F.2d at 172. It was also contended that the Philadelphia Plan further
violated Title VII by interfering with a bona fide seniority plan. Id. The Third Circuit rejected
both arguments, holding that the source of the required contract provision was not Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, but Executive Order No. 11,246; and that § 7030) of Title VII only
limited Title VII, and no other state or federal remedies. Id.
" See NoRTHRup, RACIAL Pomcms OF AMERICAN INDUsTRY, REPORT No. 1: THE NEGRO IN THE
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 34 (1968) (Wharton School, U. Pa.). See also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
SOCILL & ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF NEGROES IN THE UNrrED STATES 29, 30, 40 (Oct. 1967).
89 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
70 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-7 (1970).
7' Id. § 276a(a).
72 41 id. §§ 35-45.
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enacted after the National Industrial Recovery Act was declared unconsti-
tutional by the Supreme Court in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States."
At the time of the Schechter case the regulation of labor standards and
the alleged use of the commerce power for that purpose were considered
beyond the constitutional reach of congressional powers. Nevertheless, the
constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was repeatedly
upheld in the face of a multiplicity of court challenges.74 Similarly, both
the Davis-Bacon Act and the Walsh-Healey Act have withstood judicial
review.75 It was accepted as clearly within congressional authority to see
that the purchasing power of the federal government was not exploited by
contractors seeking to profit through the depression of wages and working
conditions." Accordingly, the Walsh-Healey Act established the 8-hour
day and 40-hour week, set safety standards, prohibited child and convict
labor, and authorized the Secretary of Labor to determine prevailing mini-
mum wages for Government contract performance." It is, to that extent,
a direct counterpart of the Davis-Bacon Act: Walsh-Healey setting labor
standards for Government supply contracts; the Davis-Bacon Act setting
labor standards for Government construction contracts. Similarly, the
Service Contract Act of 196511 brought service employees within the protec-
tion of the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
19387" and required safe and sanitary working conditions. The Walsh-
73 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
7, See, e.g., Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missell, 316 U.S. 572 (1942); Mitchell v. Pilgrim
Holiness Church, Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954); Walling
v. Peoples Packing Co., 132 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 774 (1943);
Carleton Screw Products Co. v. Fleming, 126 F.2d 537 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 634
(1942); Fleming v. Kirschbaum Co., 124 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1941), aff'd, 316 U.S. 517 (1942);
Florida Fruit & Produce, Inc. v. United States, 117 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1941); Opp Cotton Mills
v. Department of Labor, 111 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); Walling v.
Sun Publishing Co., 47 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Tenn. 1942), aff'd, 140 F.2d 445 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 728 (1944); Fleming v. Atlantic Co., 40 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ga. 1941), aff'd,
131 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1942).
" As to the Davis-Bacon Act, see, for example, United States v. Binghamton Constr. Co.,
347 U.S. 171 (1954), wherein the Supreme Court stated that the Secretary of Labor's determi-
nation on prevailing wage rates is not judicially reviewable. Id. at 177. On the nonreviewa-
bility of the Secretary's Davis-Bacon prevailing wage rate determinations, see Nello L. Teer
Co. v. United States, 348 F.2d 533 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966). For a
statement by the Court of Claims that the Government, in requiring Walsh-Healey clauses
in its contracts, "was using, legitimately, its far-reaching power to contract as it pleases to
secure objectives of a social and economic nature," see McGraw-Edison Co. v. United States,
300 F.2d 453, 456 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (footnote omitted) (dictum). The court also stated that the
purpose of the Walsh-Healey Act was to use the leverage of the Government's tremendous
purchasing power to raise labor standards. Id.
11 See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
7 41 U.S.C. §§ 35(b)-(e) (1970).
78 Id. § 351(a). See 32 C.F.R. § 12.1001 (1974). See also 29 id. § 4.168.
", 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1970).
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Healey Act applies to Government contracts for the manufacture or fur-
nishing of supplies and equipment in any amount exceeding $10,000 when
the contract is to be performed in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the
Virgin Islands."° Every contract covered is required by the Act to incorpo-
rate certain clauses stipulating to the Act's labor and wage requirements.,
Expressly exempt from the Act are purchases of such supplies as may
usually be procured on the open market, perishables, agricultural and
dairy products, contracts for the carriage of freight or personnel when
published tariff rates are in effect, and contracts for communications serv-
ices subject to the Federal Communications Act of 1934.82 The Secretary
of Labor is authorized to administer the Act, to make exceptions in the
public interest, and to issue interpretations and to implement regula-
tions.83 The President is authorized to suspend any or all of its provisions
whenever such action would be in the public interest. 4
Breach or violation of the contract stipulations incorporating the pro-
visions of the Act makes the offending party liable to the United States
for liquidated damages (in addition to damages for any other breach of the
contract) in the sum of $10 per day for each underage person and convict
laborer knowingly employed, and a sum equal to any deductions, rebates,
refunds, or underpayment of wages due any employee engaged in the per-
formance of the contract."5 In addition, the United States may terminate
the contract and repurchase the materials or supplies contracted for,
charging any excess cost to the violating contractor." Violators are also
subject to debarment from subsequent award of Government contracts for
three years from the date the Secretary of Labor determines the.breach to
have occurred.
A contract clause containing by reference the required provisions, rep-
resentations, and stipulations of the Act is set forth in ASPR section 7.103-
17. With regard to the Secretary's prevailing wage rate determinations
under the Walsh-Healey Act, however, it should be noted that no new wage
determinations other than coal wages have been made since the adverse
decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Industrial Union Depart-
ment, AFL-CIO v. Barber-Colman."7 In practical working effect, this has
41 U.S.C. § 35 (1970). See 32 C.F.R. §§ 12.601, 12.602-1 (1974).
41 U.S.C. § 35 (1970). See 32 C.F.R. §§ 12.601, 12.605 (1974).
41 U.S.C. § 43 (1970).
I ld. § 38.
m Id. § 40.
- Id. § 36.
", Id.
87 348 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1965). This case involved an action to declare void the Secretary's
determination of prevailing minimum wages in the machine tool industry and to enjoin the
enforcement of such rates. The court of appeals held that, absent findings by the Secretary
that the policy of the Walsh-Healey Act would be frustrated by including both blueprint
machine operators and draftsmen in a single minimum wage for the machine tool industry,
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resulted in the generally applicable Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)I
minimum wage rates becoming the controlling wage rate standard. The
original FLSA section 6(a)(1) 89 minimums have risen steadily0 since the
1965 Barber-Colman decision, exceeding the old Walsh-Healey rates. An-
other required contract clause, relating solely to the prohibition against the
use of convict labor pursuant to the Convict Labor Act of 1887 and Execu-
tive Order 325-A9' is set forth in ASPR section 12.203. This clause must
be included in all Government contracts involving the use of labor within
the United States except contracts covered by the Walsh-Healey Act
(which, of course, already have the convict labor prohibition), contracts for
the purchase of supplies from Federal Prison Industries, Inc., and contracts
for the purchase of the finished products of state prison industries which
are available in the open market."
The Davis-Bacon Act" applies to Government contracts for construc-
tion, alteration, or repair of public works, provided they amount to over
$2000 and are to be performed in the United States. Every such contract
must contain certain clauses94 which generally provide that
(1) all laborers and mechanics shall be paid wages not less
than those determined by the Secretary of Labor to be prevail-
ing in the area; 5
(2) such wages shall be paid unconditionally not less than once
a week, and without subsequent deductions or rebate;9
(3) the wage scale as determined by the Secretary of Labor
shall be posted by the contractor in a prominent place at the
work site; 7
(4) the contracting officer has the right to withhold from pay-
ments due to the contractor such amounts as are necessary to
the question of whether the Secretary had authority under the Act to establish more than
one minimum wage for the industry could not be reached. Id. at 789. The case was remanded
to the district court with instructions to hold it in abeyance pending further proceedings by
the Secretary. The court held that the Secretary's stated ground for establishing two mini-
mum wages was insufficient on the present record "even under his own interpretation of the
Act." Id.
29 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 202-18 (Supp. 1975).
u Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, § 6(a)(1), 52 Stat. 1060, 1062.
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1) (Supp. 1975), which
schedules further minimum wage increases for December 31, 1975, as well as additional
increases at other times for newly covered occupations. Id.
l 18 U.S.C. § 436 (1970); Exec. Order No. 325-A (May 18, 1905). See C.F.R. § 12.201 (1974).
12 32 C.F.R. § 12.202 (1974).
' 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 276a-7 (1970).
Id. § 276a(a).
5 32 C.F.R. § 18.702-1(a) (1974).
' Id. §3 18.702-1, 18.703-1. See 29 id. § 3.5 for deductions allowable at the time of payment.
,7 32 id. § 18.704-2(j).
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correct violations (such amounts to be paid to the wronged em-
ployees by the Comptroller General);" and
(5) if the contractor fails to pay the prescribed rates, the Gov-
ernment may terminate the contractor's right to proceed with
the work, and the Government may charge the excess costs of
completion to the contractor."
Breach of any of the foregoing provisions may result in the contractor being
placed on the "debarred bidders' list," rendering him ineligible to receive
Government contracts for a period of three years. 00 The Davis-Bacon Act
does not apply to supply contracts, contracts for services or maintenance
work which involve only an incidental amount of construction, alteration
or repair work, contracts to be performed outside the United States, con-
tracts for dismantling and demolition or exploratory drilling, or contracts
requiring construction work so closely related to research, experiment, and
development that it cannot be performed separately. 0 1
The McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act of 1965102 provides that
no contractor or subcontractor holding a contract to furnish services
through the use of service employees shall pay any of his employees less
than the minimum wage prescribed by the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, as amended.' 3 The Service Contract Act further mandates that fed-
eral service contracts for more than $2500 contain provisions relating to
minimum wages, fringe benefits, safe and sanitary working conditions, and
notification to employees of the compensation required under the Act. 04
The Act provides penalties for violations, including withholding of contract
payment amounts necessary to make the appropriate payment to the un-
derpaid employees," 5 and, in appropriate cases, inclusion on a debarred
bidders' list to be maintained and circulated by the Comptroller General.'
Another required contract clause, brought about by the Contract
Work Hours and Safety Standards Act'07 (CWH&SSA), applies to con-
struction contracts for over $2000'0" as does the Davis-Bacon Act, but the
CWH&SSA also applies to nonconstruction contracts over $2500. 101 The
CWH&SSA establishes the 8-hour day, 40-hour week, and time-and-a-half
for overtime."0
I d. § 7.602-23(a)(6), 18.704-7(b), -13.
Id. 99 7.602-23(a)(1)(e), -23(a)(8), 18.703-1.
'0 Id. §9 7.602-23(a)(8), 18.703-1.
oI Id. § 18.701(a).
102 41 U.S.C. § 351(a) (1970). See 32 C.F.R. § 12.1001 (1974). See also 29 id. § 4.168.
1*1 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1970).
104 41 id. § 3 51(a).
"I Id. § 352(a).
106 Id. § 354(a).
10,7 40 id. §§ 327-33. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 12.300 et seq., 18.700 et seq. (1974).
108 40 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). See 29 C.F.R. § 5.14(b)(3) (1974); 32 id. § 18.703-1.
1OS 40 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). See C.F.R. § 5.14(b)(4) (1974); 32 id. §§ 12.300, 12.301, 12.302(e).
Ito 40 U.S.C. § 328 (1970). See 32 C.F.R. §§ 12.301, 18.702-1(c) (1974).
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The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, requires that
employers pay certain minimum hourly wages"' and adhere to certain
maximum hour standards."2 In addition, it prohibits oppressive child
labor." 3 The Act originally applied only to employees engaged in interstate
or foreign commerce, production of goods for such commerce, or any closely
related process or occupation essential to such production. By amendment,
however, the Act has been broadened to include additional groups such as
agricultural employees and domestic service workers. "4 The Act enables an
employee to maintain a civil suit against his employer whenever the em-
ployee either has received less than the prescribed minimum wage or has
not been paid for overtime." 5 There are also criminal penalties for willful
violations."" There is no mandatory FLSA clause, as such,"7 to be included
in Government contracts, but since payments made pursuant to the FLSA
are regarded as "reimbursable costs" under cost-reimbursement and cost-
plus-a-fixed-fee contracts, the military does have an interest in litigation
arising out of employee claims under the Act. Accordingly, there are three
sections of the ASPR 11 specifically dealing with the Fair Labor Standards
Act, one of which gives the military department concerned the right to
approve the contractor's appointment of private counsel to defend such
suits as a condition precedent to reimbursement for judgments or litigation
expenses."'
The Copeland "Anti-Kickback" Act of 1934, as revised in 1948,120
makes it unlawful to induce, by force or otherwise, any person employed
within the United States in the construction or repair of public buildings
or public works (including those financed in whole or in part by loans or
grants from the United States) to give up any part of the compensation to
which he is entitled under his contract of employment. In accordance with
" As of January 1, 1975, the minimum is $2.10 per hour for employees covered before 1966,
$2.00 per hour for nonagricultural employees first covered in 1966, and $1.80 per hour for
agricultural employees. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1) (Supp. 1975), amending 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)
(1970). The 1974 amendments schedule further minimum wage increases for December 31,
1975, as well as separate increases at other times for newly covered occupations. 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 206(a)(1) (Supp. 1975).
112 29 U.S.C.A. § 207 (Supp. 1975).
"3 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 212 (Supp. 1975).
" The broadening of coverage was accomplished primarily by changing certain definitions
in § 203 and certain exemptions under § 213. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 203, 213 (Supp. 1975).
"I Id. § 216(b).
116 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1970).
"I The clauses required by the Service Contract Act of 1965 refer, in the case of service
employees, to the minimum wage specified under § 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
See 32 C.F.R. 88 7.1903-41(a), -41(b), 12.1004 (1974).
" Id. §§ 12.701-703.
"9 Id. § 12.702.
' 18 U.S.C. § 874 (1970).
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regulations of the Secretary of Labor' issued pursuant to the Copeland
Act, certain contracts entered into by any government department or
agency must contain a provision 2 ' requiring the contractor and any sub-
contractor to comply with the regulations of the Secretary of Labor under
the Act. Under this statute, the pertinent contract clause need not set forth
nor summarize the prohibitions of the statute, but may merely state: "The
contractor shall comply with the Copeland Regulations of the Secretary of
Labor (29 CFR, Part 3) which are incorporated herein by reference."'2 3
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS DESIGNED TO FAVOR
CERTAIN ECONOMIC AREAS AND GROUPS
In May 1956, President Eisenhower created a Cabinet Committee on
Small Business with the duty of "making specific recommendations...
for administrative actions, and where necessary for additional legislation,
to strengthen the economic position of small businesses and to foster their
sound development."'2 4 The Committee consisted of the Secretary of De-
fense and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Secretar-
ies of Commerce and Labor, the Administrator of the Small Business Ad-
ministration, the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance
Agency, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. In its
report to the President on August 7, 1956, the Committee had a fairly
pessimistic picture of the long-range outlook for small businesses in this
country:
[T]he pace of technological change has been accelerating in recent years.
Large and well-financed firms have been accustomed to undertaking costly
research and development programs, which enable them to set the pace or
meet the pace of industrial innovation and investment. Small business enter-
prises cannot normally do this.
Partly because of the needs and problems of small business and partly
because the national economy, as a whole, and defense procurement, in
particular, would benefit most by a wider dispersion of healthy and pros-
perous small business enterprises, the federal government developed a
program of actively aiding small businesses, not only through the Small
Business Administration, but also through procurement programs. Aside
from the benefits of a free competitive economy, the military is particu-
larly interested in having available, and readily accessible in times of
emergency, a multiplicity of suppliers for each item needed. It is danger-
121 29 C.F.R. §§ 3.1, 3.9 (1974).
122 32 id. §§ 7.602-23(a)(5), 18.702-1(b).
23 Id. §§ 7.602-23(a)(5), 18.703-(e).
24 Letter from President Eisenhower to Arthur F. Bums, Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisors, May 1956.
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ous, impractical, and costly to have only single-source suppliers to turn to
when tremendous volume is suddenly essential.
Working at cross-purposes with this desire to nurture and favor small
businesses, however, is the difficulty of dealing with the military. Knowing
what the military wants usually involves more than just contacting mili-
tary buyers and glancing at published lists of contracts to be let. Their
demands continually press against the outer perimeters of the current
state-of-the-art and the anticipated future state-of-the-art. This means
that most of the large military prime contracts will go to those vendors who
engage in extensive and expensive research and development (R&D) pro-
grams. In certain areas the cost of R&D is so expensive that even the
largest corporations cannot be induced, to make the expenditures, and
accordingly the Government "foots the bill." Where private financing has
paid for the R&D, however, it has become traditional for the Government
to award the huge "follow-on" procurement contracts with the firm that
has performed this function. Aside from the reward aspect, technical and
financial considerations compel the same result. There are few suppliers-
who could undertake the delivery of finished weapons, weapons systems,
or complex aircraft or space vehicles on the time schedules demanded if
they had not already actively participated in the research and develop-
ment of the subject item, and had not already been "tooled up"-
personnel-wise and plant-wise-for the complex production process.
Furthermore, pressing to its limits the state-of-the-art involves precise
specifications, completely new materials and fabricating processes beyond
the capacity of most small firms.
Even more frustrating to the smaller business firm is the complexity
of the legal and administrative procedures established for dealing with the
Government, and the continuous decision-changes and various levels of
decision-making within the Government military procurement structure.
To state it as an oversimplification-selling to the military is not a simple
and straightforward task.
The military cannot specify the quantity of a new item until it is
reasonably assured of its performance. Since no one can know how good
the item is until after an extensive test program, decisions to buy are,
therefore, a mixture of cautious optimism, some knowledge, a sharing of
the risks involved, and a lack of any real commitment to purchase sizeable
numbers of the produced items. In any event, it is not easy to get a firm
yes or no as to the item or its quantity, and decisions affecting the eventual
procurement of the item will vacillate through several levels of the military
and Defense Department structure. Consider for example, the Boeing Air-
craft Company in the TFX F-111 fiasco.2 5 Boeing had been picked four
times by the 250-member Navy-Air Force Board of Experts as the best and
'12 See note 34 supra.
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most qualified source for the production of the new jet bomber. But who
got the contract? General Dynamics, of course. In addition to exemplifying
the difficulty of forecasting the choice for a particular procurement, the
choice of General Dynamics in Fort Worth over Boeing in Seattle illus-
trates the importance the Government places on maintaining many poten-
tial suppliers, as opposed to relying on only one or two "sole source" giants.
It is unfortunate, however, that implementation of such policy should
prove so timely and costly, as is evidenced by the Boeing experience.
Even beyond the initial award, frustrations are many, and often disas-
trous to the small firm. Requirements for the item may change continu-
ously, and development of a similar but better product elsewhere often
drops the bottom out of expected huge "follow-on" contracts, making pres-
ent machinery and specially trained personnel of the small supplier not
only unproductive, but suddenly useless. Thus, it is readily apparent that
if a company is to survive in the military procurement business, in other
than those production fields for "off-the-shelf' items readily adaptable to
the civilian market, substantial company resources are required. For some
appreciation of the growing magnitude of R&D in procurement of new
military equipment, consider the following data. R&D costs for most World
War II aircraft were ordinarily measured in hundreds of thousands or mil-
lions of dollars, with "follow-on" procurements in tens or hundreds of
millions. 2 ' In comparison with these World War II figures, R&D on the B-
52 ran into millions, with procurement costs in the billions;'2 R&D on the
TFX F-111 ran to two billion, with follow-on procurement estimated to run
$12 to $15 billion;12 and the ballistic missile development program already
has R&D costs in the billions, with no estimates for a top on the procure-
ment "follow-ons.' ' 29
To counteract these depressing effects on small firms, so as to both
preserve a widely dispersed diversity of viable, potential suppliers for
emergency needs, and to foster and encourage the prosperity of small en-
trepeneurs and free competition as a stated national economic aim, the
Government contracting program has developed a variety of artifical de-
vices to actively discriminate in favor of small business firms.2 ° The Small
Business Act of 1953,"1' after stating the foregoing policy objectives, also
states that in order to further those objectives the federal government is
to take steps "to insure that a fair proportion of the total purchases and
21 Novick & Springer, Economics of Defense Procurement and Small Business, 24 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 118, 124 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Novick & Springer].
' Id.
'21 See note 34 supra.
129 Novick & Springer, supra note 126, at 124.
'3' See Schreiber, Small Business & Government Procurement, 29 LAW & CONTrEMP. PROB. 390
(1964).
131 15 U.S.C. §§ 630-51 (1970).
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contracts for property and services for the Government. . .be placed with
small-business enterprises, [and] to insure that a fair proportion of the
total sales of Government property be made to such enterprises . . .to
maintain and strengthen the over-all economy of the Nation."'' 2
The mechanics by which small business receives preference in Govern-
ment procurement is multifaceted. With respect to procurement by the
armed services, there are four principal methods: "set-asides" for small
business firms,'3 3 either partial' 3 or total;'35 the Defense subcontracting
small business program;' 6 the priorities system when an "equally-low-
bidders" situation develops;'37 and contracting directly with the Small
Business Administration, which, in turn, relets contracts and subcontracts
with several small business firms.13
8
Set-Asides for Small Business
In set-asides for small businesses,' 39 all or a portion of a procurement
is reserved for award solely to small business firms. Because large busi-
nesses are not eligible for competition in, or negotiation for, contracts
awarded under these set-asides, this procedure is regarded as negotiation
rather than the formal advertising method,'40 although elements of the
formal advertising method are involved. Total set-asides for small business
are authorized where there is a reasonable expectation that bids or propos-
als will be received from a sufficient number of responsible small firms to
assure that awards can be made at reasonable prices.' The procedure used
may be either the conventional negotiation or the preferred special method
known as "Small Business Restricted Advertising."'4 2 Contracting under
this latter technique is the same as other procurements by formal advertis-
ing and competitive bidding, except that only the bids of small business
concerns are eligible for consideration.'4 3
A partial set-aside involves restricted small business involvement in
I3 d. § 631. The Defense Department adheres to the Small Business Administration's defini-
tion of "small business concern" as being "a concern that is independently owned and oper-
ated, is not dominant in its field of operations, and with its affiliates does not employ more
than" a specified number of employees (500, 750 or 1,000, depending upon the type of prod-
.uct). 13 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1974). See also 15 U.S.C. § 632 (1970); 32 C.F.R. § 1.701 (1974).
'3 32 C.F.R. § 1.706 (1974).
'' Id. §§ 1.706-6, 7.2003-3.
' Id. §§ 1.706-5, 7.2003-2.
,3, Id. §§ 1.707, 7.104-14, 7.602-26(b). See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (1970).
137 32 C.F.R. § 2.407-6 (1974).
' See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1970); 32 C.F.R. § 1.705-5(a) (1974).
'' 32 C.F.R. § 1.706 (1974).
140 Id. § 1.706-2.
"I Id. § 1.706-5(a)(1).
"2 Id. § 1.706-5(b).
143 Id.
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only a portion of procurement.1 " A partial set-aside is authorized where the
procurement is divisible into two or more economic production runs, and
several small businesses are believed to have the technical competency and
plant capacity to furnish not less than one economic production run."' The
procurement is divided into the non-set-aside portion and the set-aside
portion. After the award price for the non-set-aside portion is fixed, nego-
tiations begin for the set-aside portion, and only with those who have
submitted offers on the non-set-aside portion."' Negotiations are con-
ducted with small business firms according to the order of priority set forth
in ASPR section 7.2003-3(a), 47 except that when equal low bids are re-
ceived on the non-set-aside portion from firms which are equally eligible
for the set-aside portion, the firm which is awarded the non-set-aside por-
tion gets the first priority in negotiations for the set-aside portion. Within
the same priority group, offers are requested from firms in the order of their
offers on the non-set-aside portion, starting with the lowest responsive
offer. Subject to certain exceptions, awards under the set-aside portion are
made at the highest unit price awarded on the non-set-aside portion." 8
Defense Subcontracting Small Business Program
Small business firms make almost as much money on defense subcon-
tracting annually as they do on prime contracts, and in fact small firms
get a much larger percentage or portion of total defense subcontracts than
they do of prime contracts. In the small business preference under the
subcontracting program, 4 ' two contract clauses yield the desired result.
First, most prime contracts involving more than $5,000'" must contain a
clause entitled "Utilization of Small Business Concerns" by which the
prime contractor "agrees to accomplish the maximum amount of subcon-
tracting to small business concerns"'' 1 that is consistent with "efficient
performance" of the contract. Second, contracts which contain that clause,
if they involve over $500,0001 and which, in the opinion of the procuring
activity, offer substantial subcontracting possibilities, shall also include
the "Defense Subcontracting Small Business Program" clause.' 5 This
clause requires the prime contractor to establish a detailed program, sub-
ject to contracting officer supervision and termination for default or viola-
"' Id. § 1.706-6(a).
145 Id.
,,1Id. § 1.706-6(b).
147 Id. § 7.2003-3(a).
148 Id.
"' Id. §§ 1.707, 7.104-14, 7.602-26(b).
50 Id. 99 1.707-3(a), 7.104-14(a).
151 Id. 99 1.707-3(a), 7.104-14.
152 Id. 99 1.707-3(b), -3(c), 7.104-14(b).
1'5 Id. §§ 1.707-3(b), 7.104-14(b).
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tion, in order to ensure small business an equitable opportunity to compete
for the award of subcontracts. 5 4
Awards Among Equally Low Bidders
Ordinarily, the award of a contract let by competitive bidding is made
to the lowest responsible, responsive bidder. When there are two low bid-
ders, whose bids are equal in all respects, an order of priority has been
established for the award.'5 5 The highest priority is a small business firm
that will perform the contract in a labor surplus area.'56 The next prefer-
ence would be to a small business operating in other than a labor surplus
area. Next would be a large business firm operating in a labor surplus area.
The final preference would be to a large business firm not operating in a
labor surplus area. Drawing by lot would resolve the priority situations.'57
The actual priority list set forth in the ASPR is a bit more complex than
that, 5 8 but the four categories given illustrate the main divisions.
Contracting Directly with the Small Business Administration
Although not as widely utilized as the other three methods employed
in the area of military procurement, this method' 9 constitutes a valuable
tool for the encouragement of small business participation in Defense De-
partment contracting, with benefits for both the Small Business Adminis-
tration (SBA) and the military. The SBA gets the opportunity to "farm
out" all the contracts and subcontracts from a major procurement to its
statutory clients, the small business concerns.' 0 At the same time, the
military delegates to the SBA many of the administrative headaches and
details of attempting to deal with a multitude of small, relatively inexperi-
enced contractors and subcontractors.' 6'
in contracting with the SBA, any costs to the Defense Department
which are greater than the estimated current fair market price anticipated
under normal procurement procedures are paid for by the SBA.'62 These
costs include start-up, make-ready, and training expenses, or similar ini-
tial investment or learning costs above those that would normally be in-
curred by established firms engaged in the same type of business.'B Consis-
tent with Defense Department capability and resources, SBA contractors
"' See 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(2) (1970); 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-14(b) (1974).
155 32 C.F.R. § 2.407-6 (1974).
5 Id. § 2.407-6(a)(2)(i); 29 id. § 8.8.
157 32 id. §§ 2.407-6(a)(1), -6(b).
,5 Id. § 2.407-6(a)(2).
'' See Small Business Act § 8a, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1970); 32 C.F.R. § 1.705-5 (1974).
32 C.F.R. § 1.705-5(a) (1974).
"' Id. § 1.705-5(c)(1)(j).
,o Id. § 1.705-5(b)(2).
13 Id.
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under this program are afforded production assistance, including identifi-
cation of causes of deficiencies in their products and suggested corrective
action.'
In contracts for supplies, services, research, and development, it is
SBA policy to contract with only those firms which have submitted a
written business plan"5 specifically outlining a reasonable approach for
attaining ASPR policy objectives, viz., "that these [small business] con-
cerns . . . become self-sustaining, competitive entities within a reasonable
period of time."'' Along with other facts submitted regarding the firm,'67
the business plan, once approved by the SBA, is the basis for the Defense
Department's consideration of participation in a section 8(a) 68 program
with the firm., 9 The military department concerned evaluates the SBA's
request for a commitment and if it is approved, notifies the SBA that
contracts will be placed with the SBA as requested.7 ' This notification
constitutes a firm commitment by the Defense Department with the SBA,
provided there is no material change in requirements, availability of funds,
or other factors. 7 1
Another device that is beneficial to small business concerns is that of
"leader company procurement." It is in the interest of the Government to
promote widespread knowledge of industrial skills and techniques neces-
sary for the production of certain complex military end items. Accordingly,
the ASPR 172 provide that the military may, under certain circumstances 7 1
(generally for reasons of economy, scarcity of tooling or equipment, short-
age of time, etc.) use the device of "leader company procurement." This
device enables a prime contractor to subcontract partial quantities of the
end item to other manufacturers (follower subcontractors) and to actively
assist them in conforming to the Government's specifications. 7 This is an
extraordinary procurement technique, however, with strict limitations on
its use.'7 1
Of considerable importance to small business firms dealing with the
'" Id. § 1.705-5(b)(3).
,85 Id. § 1.705-5(c)(1)(a).
88 Id. § 1.705-5(b).
,a Considerations include: the background and ownership of the firm; how and when it is
expected to become a self-sustaining entity; the extent to which procurement assistance is
needed, with identification of the requirements sought from the Defense Department; present
production capacity including related facilities; and how any additional facilities needed will
be provided. Id. § 1.705-5(c)(1)(a).
'" Small Business Act § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1970).
too See 32 C.F.R. § 1.705-5(c)(1)(a) (1974).
170 Id. § 1.705-5(c)(1)(c).
171 Id.
172 Id. § 4.701.
73 Id. §§ 4.701-02.
17, Id. §§ 4.701-03.
1 Id. §§ 4.701-.702.
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Government is the fact that the Small Business Adminstration has statu-
tory authority'76 to certify the capacity"' and credit of any small business
concern. Contracting officers must accept SBA certificates of competency
as conclusive on the issue of the prospective contractor's capacity 8 and
credit,'79 subject to certain limited appeals within the SBA.' s"
Additional assistance to small businesses includes: loans; the use and
lease of Government property, 8' buildings,8 2 tooling and machinery' 8 3 and
special test equipment;' 8 manufacturing information;"' technical and
managerial aid;'6 " financing;8 7 assistance in obtaining R&D contracts and
in receiving the benefits of Government-sponsored research and develop-
ment; 8 and tax assistance. 8 ' It should be noted, however, that some of the
foregoing benefits are also available to all government contractors, not just
the small business firms.
As already suggested by the list of priorities mentioned in the discus-
sion of small business, there are similar preferences, 90 required clauses,"'
priorities,8 2 and partial9 3 and combined 4 set-asides in the case of so-
called "labor surplus areas:" probably more commonly known as "econom-
ically depressed areas," "high unemployment areas," or "areas of persist-
ent unemployment."'95 However, unlike the case of small business, total
set-asides are prohibited for labor surplus area firms.'" Combined set-
asides are procurements wherein the total required quantity of an item is
set aside for exclusive participation by small business firms, and then a
71 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(7) (1970).
177 "Capacity" means the overall ability of a prospective small business contractor to
meet quality, quantity, and time requirements of a proposed contract, and includes
ability to perform, organization, experience, technical knowledge, skills, "know-how,"
technical equipment and facilities or the ability to obtain them.
32 C.F.R. § 1.705-4(a) (1974).
171 Id. §§ 1.705-4(a), 1.903-1(ii), 1.903-2.
7 Id. § 1.705-4(a), 1-903-1(i).
ISO Id. § 1.705-4(a), (c), (f), (g).
SI Id. § 13.000 et seq.
182 Id. § 13.101-8.
I- Id. § 13.101-5.
19, Id. § 13.101-6.
195 Id. § 1.705-3.
I See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
18 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 636, 637a, 684, 685, 687 (1970).
t See Small Business Act § 8(b), 15 U.S.C. § 638(b) (1970); 32 C.F.R. §§ 13,301-.408 (1974).
"' Tax assistance includes accelerated amortization and depreciation for "emergency facili-
ties" necessary for national defense. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 168.
IN See 29 C.F.R. § 8.8 (1974); 32 id. § 1.803(a)(2).
'" See 32 id. § 1.805-3(a), -3(b), 7.104-20(a), -20(b).
", See id. § 2.407-6(a)(2).
" See id. § 1.804.
"' See id. § 1.706-7(a).
1" See 29 id. §§ 8.2-.4, 8.7.
"' See 32 id. 1.803(a)(2).
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portion of that is further set-aside for small business firms that are also
labor surplus area firms."7
It is the policy of the Defense Department to aid depressed areas by
placing contracts with labor surplus area concerns and to encourage prime
contractors to subcontract with similar concerns.' 8 In performing this
objective via the priorities system referred to earlier, however, a price
differential cannot be paid. The original Defense Manpower Policy No. 4
allowed payment of price differentials in effectuating the labor surplus
area policy, but riders attached to subsequent defense appropriations over-
ruled that aspect of the policy, and it was accordingly changed to include
an express prohibition against price differentials.'99
In addition to the labor surplus set-asides program for prime contracts
(favoring labor surplus areas in a manner similar to the small business set-
asides program) and the "priorities system" in the "equal low bids" situa-
tion (which works in combination with the small business prime contracts
priorities system),94 the labor surplus program includes a major subcon-
tracting program. 0' The Government's labor surplus area subcontracting
program requires government prime contractors to assume an affirmative
obligation with respect to subcontracting with labor surplus area firms.10
The Secretary of Labor has the authority to designate an area as a "labor
surplus area," an "area of substantial unemployment or underemploy-
ment," a "section of concentrated unemployment or underemployment,"
or an "area of persistent unemployment"2°0 -all terms having important
meaning throughout the ASPR sections prescribing the subject prefer-
ences.
204
In prime contracts ranging from $5000 to $500,000, the prime contrac-
tor undertakes the simple obligation of using his best efforts to either place
his subcontracts with firms in labor surplus areas or agrees to perform in
a labor surplus area himself. Pursuant to a required contract clause enti-
tled "Utilization of Concerns in Labor Surplus Areas, 2 05 this obligation is
to be carried out in a manner consistent with the efficient performance of
the contract and at prices no higher than those obtainable elsewhere. In
"I See id. § 1.706-6(a). See also Exec. Order No. 10582, § 3, 19 Fed. Reg. 8723 (1954). Section
3(c) permits rejection of foreign bids in any situation where the domestic low bidder would
produce substantially all the materials in areas of substantial unemployment, as determined
by the Secretary of Labor, if such preference would be in the national interest, as determined
by the President.
go See C.F.R. § 1.800 (1974).
'" Shulman, supra note 37, at 264.
20 32 C.F.R. § 2.407-6 (1974); 29 id. § 8.8.
01 32 id. §§ 1.803(a), (b), 1.805, 7.104-20(b).
202 Id. § 1.805-2.
20I See 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-d (1970); Exec. Order No. 10,582, 19 Fed. Reg. 8723 (1954); Defense
Manpower Policy No. 4, 32A C.F.R. 33 (1974).
214 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 8.2-.4, 8.7 (1974).
32 id. §§ 1.805-3(a), 7.104-20(a).
21 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1975
contracts of over $500,000, pursuant to a mandatory contract clause enti-
tled "Labor Surplus Area Subcontracting Program," 06 the prime contrac-
tor is required to undertake a series of specific responsibilities with regard
to subcontracting to labor surplus area firms. The clause requires
recordkeeping, reporting, and close liaison with the contacting officer re-
garding progress of the labor surplus area program.107
Additionally, with regard to "depressed industries," there are other
provisions. When an entire industry is depressed, the Director of the Office
of Emergency Planning, under Defense Manpower Policy Number 4, may
establish appropriate measures on an industry-wide, as opposed to an area-
wide, basis. Such industries will then be given special treatment in the
awarding of Government contracts according to a plan of action adopted
by the Office of Emergency Preparedness.'"' An express exception to this
is the petroleum industry.209
"Buy AMERICAN" REQUIREMENTS
A congressional purpose favoring the use of American products and
labor can be found as early as 1865 in the Naval Service Appropriation
Act, 10 and in the Army Appropriation Act of 1876.11 In 1933, partially as
an antidepression device, 2 1 Congress enacted the "Buy American" Act,2 12
which applies to all Government departments and independent agencies, 2 1
and both construction 215 and supply contracts. 210 The Act requires that
purchases of goods and materials for public use be limited to American-
unmanufactured goods and materials, and such American-manufactured
goods and materials as have been substantially made from parts and raw
materials mined, produced or manufactured in the United States. 21 7 Goods
and materials acquired for use outside the United States are excepted.2 1 8
In addition, where compliance would be either too costly or inconsistent
with the public interest,219 where the goods and materials involved are not
- Id. §§ 1.805-3(b), 7.104-20(b).
- Id. §§ 1.707-4, 1.805-4, 7.104-20(b).
- Id. § 1.806-1.
- Id. § 1.806-2.
210 Act of March 2, 1865, ch. 74, § 7, 13 Stat. 462, 467 (Navy could purchase only American
bunting).
"' Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 133, §3, 18 Stat. (pt. 3) 452, 455 (American labor and material
preferred for public improvement contracts).
"1 76 Cong. Rec. 2985, 3171 (1933).
213 41 U.S.C. §§ lOa-d (1970).
21 Id. §§ 10a, b.
215 Id. § lob.
21 Id. § 10a.
217 Id.
218 Id.
2t1 Id. §§ 10a, d.
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manufactured, mined or produced in the United States in sufficient quant-
ity, or where the goods and materials involved are not of satisfactory qual-
ity,"" an exception is provided. The Act also requires the inclusion of a
clause in all Government construction contracts binding the contractor
and all subcontractors, suppliers, and materialmen to abide by the same
policy.22t The "Buy American" Act provides for debarment of contractors
and certain subcontractors, materialmen, and suppliers for violation of
contract provisions required by the Act.2 ' The debarment is for a term of
three years from the date the head of the contracting department or agency
finds a violation and it bars the contractor from further Government con-
struction contracts.2 2 3
In addition to the "Buy American" Act, there is a similar recurring
provision in military appropriation acts.224 Unlike the "Buy American"
Act, these recurring provisions apply only to purchases by the military
departments rather than to all Government agencies. These provisions
basically prohibit purchasing foreign food or clothing when American
items are available.
CONCLUSION
It is believed that the foregoing, although admittedly broad brush,
treatment amply illustrates the Government's commitment to advancing
its national economic and socioeconomic goals through its own contracting
and procurement program. Unquestionably, the inclusion of such socio-
economic policies as mandatory requirements in federal contracts has sub-
stantially increased the Government's cost of doing business, but the Gov-
ernment and the courts22 have long recognized that such additional costs
are willingly incurred to effectuate policies in the public interest. Exten-
sive federal purchasing of goods, services, and research projects not only
results in a substantial contribution toward furthering those policies in the
220 Id. § 10a.
21 Id. § 10b(a).
2 Id. § 10b(b).
22 Id. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 6.100, 6.102-1, 7.104-3, 7.602-20, 7.1702-2, 18.507 (1974). See also 19
Fed. Reg. 8723 (1954), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,051, 27 Fed. Reg. 9683 (1962).
2 See, e.g., Navy Department & Naval Service Appropriation Act for 1940, ch. 149, 53 Stat.
757, 767 (1939); The Fifth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of 1941, ch. 41,
55 Stat. 123, 125; The Naval Appropriation Act of 1942, ch. 86, 55 Stat. 151, 159 (1941); The
Military Appropriation Act of 1942, ch. 262, 55 Stat. 366, 373 (1941). See also Defense Depart-
ment Appropriation Act of 1953, ch. 630, 66 Stat. 517, 521 (1952).
2" See, e.g., Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261 (1943), where the Court
noted that "Congress has often required the inclusion in government contracts of terms not
directly related to the interests of the government as purchaser, which have the effect of
increasing cost." Id. at 273. See also Eastern States Petroleum & Chem. Corp. v. Seaton, 163
F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C. 1958), wherein an oil importer attempted to have the Government's
"Voluntary Oil Import Program" limiting imports of foreign crude oil pursuant to Executive
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economy as a whole, but also encourages the private sector to follow the
Government's lead by making it clear that implementation of those poli-
cies is an accepted norm of fair play, a means of avoiding labor unrest, and
a method of achieving sensible long-range industry standards.
Order 10,761 and the "Buy American" Act declared illegal. The district court held, in part,
as follows:
The Court is of the opinion that there is a dual legal basis for this order. First is the
Buy American Act. . . which requires the Government to buy only such unmanufac-
tured articles. . . as have been mined or produced in the United States. . . . Another
legal basis for this order is to be found in the power of the Government to decide what
products it will or will not buy for its own use. Ordinarily, the Government, under
pertinent statutes, buys supplies from the lowest responsible bidder, but it has a right
to reject bids that are not in accordance with the public interest.
Id. at 798.
